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Recent studies show that what connotes an object is first of all a certain spatio-temporal structure. In this paper we describe some
of the temporal features characterizing the temporal structure of objects: pre-existence, persistence, conservation of identity in spite
of perceptive discontinuity, surviving changes in colour, size, and shape. We argue that time is an indispensable attribute for every
type of object and briefly discuss the implication of this view with respect to a specific neuropsychological syndrome: unilateral
spatial neglect.
 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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What is an object? What counts as an object?
Some researchers, such as David Marr, expressed a
pessimistic opinion about the possibility of providing an
answer to this question:
Is a nose an object? Is a head one? Is it still one if its attached to
a body? What about a man on horseback? These questions
show that the difficulties in trying to formulate what should
be recovered as a region from an image are so great as to
amount almost to philosophical problems. There is really no
answer to them—all these things can be an object if you want
to think of them that way, or they can be part of a larger object
(Marr, 1982).
When considering the mind as a whole, Marrs pes-
simism is certainly appropriate: almost everything can
be conceived as an object. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, object is ‘‘something placed before
the eyes, or presented to the sight or other sense; an
individual thing seen or perceived, or that may be seen
or perceived; a material thing.’’ Mountains and trees,
but also quarks, chairs and parliaments: all are objects.
At the earlier levels of sensorial analysis and with
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swer. Evidence from different experimental paradigms
(change detection task, selective looking, multiple object
tracking) demonstrate that what connotes an object in
general is first of all a certain spatio-temporal structure
(Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Pylyshyn, 2001; Quinlan,
1998; Sagi & Julesz, 1985; Scholl, 2001).
Recent studies have explored what kind of spatial
features a stimulus must have in order to count as an
object. In the context of the multiple object tracking
method—a paradigm that will be described in the fol-
lowing sections—Scholl, Pylyshyn, and Feldman (2001)
have begun to examine some of the spatial factors
which mediate the degree to which various clusters of
features can count as an object. The results show a
differential contribution of factors such as connected-
ness, part structure, and other types of perceptual
grouping.
What remains to be defined in an experimental and
structured way is the temporal structure of objects, that
is the temporal features which connote objecthood.
In this paper we will try to show that time is not less
problematic than space. A way to approach the prob-
lem is to consider a pile of sand and a pile-shaped
object coated in sand. What is it that distinguishes
them? Using the method of the violation of expectancy,
Huntley-Fenner, Carey, and Salimando (2002) havereserved.
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pile-shaped object, but not for a pile of sand. The study
used pile-shaped objects and piles perceptually indis-
tinguishable. It was only upon seeing the entity being
poured (in the case of sand) or lowered (in the case of
the object) onto the stage that infants could identify the
resulting pile-shaped entity as the sand or the sand
object.
A pile of sand is not an object, in spite of the fact that
when stationary it may be perceptually indistinguishable
from one. To comprehend why we must consider the
temporal features which connote an object. In the next
section, drawing on evidences from experimental psy-
chology, neuropsychology and studies on young infants,
we will describe some of the temporal features connoting
objecthood. We will argue that, as shown by the ex-
periment of Huntley-Fenner et al. (2002), spatio-tem-
poral features have priority over surface properties such
as shape and colour. In the last section, we will discuss
the implication of these views with respect to a
specific neuropsychological syndrome: unilateral spatial
neglect.2. Temporal features of objecthood
Time is an indispensable attribute for every type of
object, be it visual or auditory. Contrary to spatial di-
mension, which seems to regard visual but not auditory
objects, time connotes also auditory objects such as a
melody (Kubovy & Van Valkenburg, 2001).
In this section we describe some of the temporal
features connoting objecthood: pre-existence, persis-
tence, and conservation of identity through occlusion.
2.1. Pre-existence
Upon entering a dark room and switching on the
light, I have the sensation that the illuminated objects
were already there. The apparition of the object in the
perceptive field marks the beginning of the objects
presence, but not the beginning of its existence: the
object appears as pre-existent. This is the form of per-
manence that Michotte (1950) calls permanence of an-
teriority to indicate the fact that the object or one of its
parts seem to have had an existence anterior to their
perception.
In the phenomenon of the ‘‘screen effect,’’ where an
object is seen to emerge from behind an occluder, the
pre-existence turns into the impression of ‘‘coming out
from.’’ ‘‘When the speed and the size are conveniently
chosen, the observer,’’ writes Michotte (1950), ‘‘doesnt
see the bar born and grow up, as it actually does, but
sees a rigid bar of fixed dimension, appear from the
square, slide from beneath the square, that formerly
would have covered it.’’The bar pre-exists: although unperceived, it exists
before its apparition.
2.2. Persistence
On switching off the light, objects disappear without
going out of existence. They survive their disappearance,
continuing to exist even when they ceased to be visible
(permanence of posteriority). Recent studies (Spelke,
Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein, 1995), based on the
paradigm of the violation of expectancy, show how 4.5
month-old infants expect objects to continue to exist
when out of view. Infants were shown two screens with a
gap between them. A first object emerged from the left
edge of the left screen and then returned behind the
screen; after a suitable delay, a second, physically
identical object emerged from the right edge of the right
screen and then returned behind it. No object ever ap-
peared in the space between the two screens. Like adults,
infants expected to find two distinct objects behind the
two screens.
Since only one object could be seen at a time, to ex-
pect two distinct objects infants must have maintained
both objects when out of view. These results suggest that
infants have the permanence of objects and interpret the
spatio-temporal discontinuity as evidence for two nu-
merically distinct objects.
2.3. Conservation of identity in spite of perceptive
discontinuity
Michotte (1950) defines this feature permanence of
continuity: the object remains itself, maintains its iden-
tity, in spite of its discontinuous perceptive presence.
A useful paradigm for studying the maintenance of
objects over time is the multiple object tracking (MOT),
thought up by Pylyshyn (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). In the
canonical MOT experiment, subjects view a display con-
sisting of a field of identical items (bidimensional stimuli
such as points, plus signs or circles). A certain subset of
items is flashed to mark its status as target. All the items
then begin to move independently and unpredictably
about the screen. Subjects must attentionally track the
targets. Since targets and distractors are identical during
the motion phase, subjects can only succeed by picking
out the targets when they are initially flashed and keep
track of them.A large number of experiments have shown
that observers can individuate andkeep track onup to five
targets in a field of 10 identical elements.
In a series of three MOT experiments, Scholl and
Pylyshyn (1999) found that subjects are able to suc-
cessfully keep a track of the items even when they
are briefly, but completely occluded during their mo-
tion. The experiments evaluated different conditions of
spatio-temporal interruption: occlusion, instantaneous
disappearance and reappearance, implosion and explo-
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outlined rectangles acting as occluders: items disap-
peared and reappeared from behind them, being absent
from the display during their motion to the degree that
they intersected one of these occluders. In the disap-
pearance and reappearance condition items disappeared
and reappeared instantaneously. In the implosion and
explosion condition disappearance and reappearance
were again gradual, but from the centres of the items:
instead of accreting and deleting along a fixed contour,
as in the occlusion condition, items imploded and ex-
ploded into and out of existence from their centres.
The results show that successful tracking requires the
presence of accretion and deletion cues along a fixed
contour: performance is severely impaired when the
items appear and disappear in ways which do not im-
plicate the presence of occluders, as in the instantaneous
disappearance/reappearance condition and implosion/
explosion condition.
The existence of a mechanism for tracking through
occlusion is supported by neuropsychological evidence,
discussed by Scholl and Pylyshyn. Assad and Maunsell
(1995) have, for example, discovered in the posterior
parietal cortex of the monkey groups of neurons which
fire as though signaling the presence of motion behind
an occluder, even during intervals in which there is no
motion on the retinal image.
The possibility that these neurons are part of an ob-
ject tracking system is supported by recent neuroimag-
ing studies indicating increased parietal activation in a
multiple object tracking task, relative to a passive
viewing condition (Culham et al., 1998). In line with
these results, Michel, Henaff, and Intriligator (1997)
have found that patients with parietal brain lesions are
severely impaired in attentive tracking tasks.
What are the implications of such results for perma-
nence of continuity? According to the authors, this
pattern of results suggests that there is a mechanism for
the individuation and maintenance of visual objects that
does not require spatio-temporal continuity, but has a
specific tolerance for interruptions of presence consis-
tent with occlusion (Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999).
Bower (1974) shows how the same distinction between
occlusion and interruption of existence takes place in in-
fants. The experiment compares infants visual search for
objects that disappear by shrinking down to nothing with
their visual search for objects that disappear by progres-
sive deletion along a boundary. Infants searched for the
missing object in the latter case, but not in the former.
2.4. Surviving changes in colour, size, and shape
In some circumstances, spatio-temporal features seem
to be more tightly coupled with the representation of
objects than surfaced-based features such as shape or
colour. Using the MOT paradigm, Scholl, Pylyshyn, andFranconeri (submitted) have, for example, shown that
successfully attending to the targets throughout the
tracking phase results in the encoding of spatio-tempo-
ral properties such as location and direction, but not
featural properties such as colour and shape: subjects
are able to report the location and direction of move-
ment of the tracked items, but not changes in colours
and shape.
The claim that featural differences do not affect the
object identity is further underscored by the phenome-
non of the ‘‘tunnel effect’’ (Burke, 1952). The basic
paradigm is to show adults an object going behind a
screen, or into a tunnel, followed by another object
emerging out the other side. Under some circumstances
the object is perceived as persisting behind the occluder.
Interestingly, the amodal completion—so called because
the observers do not see the object behind the screen—is
exclusively determined by spatio-temporal consider-
ations (the speed of the object, the time behind the oc-
cluder, the relative sizes of the object to that of the
occluder). The features of the objects play a minimal
role in the tunnel effect. If we see a red ball going behind
an occluder and a blue box emerging from the other
side, we perceive it as the same object that has changed
properties.
The priority of spatio-temporal features is supported
by neuropsychological evidence from Balint syndrome.
Among many different type of deficits, including spatial
disorientation, optic ataxia, and impaired depth per-
ception, patients affected by Balint syndrome show si-
multanagnosia, that is the inability to perceive more than
one object at a time. Such patients fail even the simplest
task which require them to compute a relation between
two separate objects. Balint patients are, for example,
unable to determine if two parallel lines are of equal
lengths. However, when the two lines are simply con-
nected by other lines at each end to form a single shape,
they can tell whether the shape is a rectangle or a
trapezoid (Holmes & Horax, 1919). As regards the
perception of visual features, often simultanagnosic
patients report seeing the colours of each of the objects
in the display float through the single object which they
are perceiving (Humphreys, Cinel, Wolfe, Olson, &
Klempen, 2000), as if the perceived object were not tied
to any particular set of visual features.3. Spatio-temporal structure vs. spatio-temporal informa-
tion
The discussion so far has focused on the structure of
objects (What counts as an object? Which properties
qualify objecthood?). A related question concerns object
individuation: what kind of information do we use for
decision about individuation and numerical identity of
objects?
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sensitive to object properties, do not use kind differences
as a basis for object individuation. Imagine the follow-
ing scenario. One screen is put on a puppet stage. A
duck emerges from behind the screen and returns behind
it. Then a ball emerges from behind the same screen and
then returns. How many objects are behind the screen?
For adults, the answer is at least two objects: a duck and
a ball. As there is only one single screen occluding the
objects, this answer does not rely on spatio-temporal
evidence, but on considerations relating to object
properties and kind. Shown the above event, 10-month-
old infants fail to draw the inference that there should be
two objects, whereas 12-month-old infants succeed in
the task.
These results are consistent with the idea that, in
adults, two distinct representational systems underlie
object individuation (Carey & Xu, 2001). The first is the
so-called mid-level system (mid-level, in the sense that it
falls between the low level sensory processing and high
level categorial processing) that indexes attended objects
and track them through time, without encoding their
properties. This system, available since the first phase of
infancy, privileges the spatio-temporal information. At
around 12 months of age a second system of object in-
dividuation emerges, a fully conceptual system, drawing
on kind information. Both systems are designed to solve
similar problems: when the spatio-temporal information
is lacking or ambiguous, object individuation is granted
to this second system.
Returning to the question of the object structure,
should be noted that both the mid-level system and the
kind-based system lead to the identification of an
object connoted by the above mentioned spatio-tempo-
ral features.4. Conclusions
In psychology as in neuropsychology time has been
generally regarded as a parameter to be varied, not as a
topic of investigation.
In front of a proliferation of neuroscientific studies
concerning the ways in which spatial locations are rep-
resented in egocentric (self-centred) and allocentric
(other-centred) frames of reference, time has until now
remained unexplored.
The consequences of this surprising lacuna are not
incidental. The effects of a lack of investigation on time
are, for instance, felt in the comprehension of neuro-
psychological pathologies such as unilateral neglect.
Unilateral neglect is the name given to a collection of
disorders in which the patients fail to perceive or re-
spond to certain stimuli in their controlateral hemispace.
Historically, the phenomena of neglect have been char-
acterized exclusively in spatial terms, being analyzedwith respect to different aspects of spatial cognition (for
a review, see Kerkoff, 2001). But what about time?
In a famous experiment by Bisiach and Luzzati
(1978), two patients with right hemisphere lesions were
asked to imagine themselves at one end of a well-known
square and describe all the places of business on the
plaza. They failed to recall shops, cafes, etc., on the left.
Remarkably, when imagining themselves at the other
end of the plaza, they named the previously neglected
places but omitted those recalled before.
An explanation of the deficit shown by these patients
exclusively in spatial terms, fails to account for a para-
doxical aspect: the previously recalled details were ne-
glected and vice versa, the previously omitted details
were recalled. Changing the vantage point disrupted the
continuing existence of some details, which ceased to
exist, whereas other details imploded into existence.
How is this possible?
The temporal feature of permanence of anteriority
and posteriority must, in some way, be disrupted in
unilateral neglect. Neglect affects not only the unitarity
of space, but the continuity of the temporal dimension.
Patients affected by neglect not only fail to respond to
stimuli presented in the hemispace controlateral to the
lesion but behave as if the controlateral hemispace did
not exist and had never existed.
The same considerations apply to object-based ne-
glect. Many studies (see, for example, Caramazza &
Hillis, 1990; Driver, Baylis, Goodrich, & Rafel, 1994;
Subbiah & Caramazza, 2000) suggest that neglect may
also be object-based, in such a way that patients neglect
halves of objects. Again, the neglected half is not simply
out of sight, but has ceased to exist: patients behave as if
it had never existed. As in the experiment by Bisiach and
Luzzati (1978), the permanence of the object must in
some way be disrupted.Acknowledgments
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